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Abstract This article traces the career of risk across promi-
nent theoretical approaches by highlighting their key assump-
tions and premises, specifically the technical approach found 
in the physical sciences, and economics, psychology, and 
sociology in the social sciences. In each discipline, the 
strengths and limitations of each theoretical approach are 
pointed out. The discussion focuses on sociology in particular 
because other approaches—in treating risks as dominantly 
technical, psychological, or economic phenomena—tend to 
downplay the broader historical and socio-political context that 
impinges on risk construction and production, and its differen-
tial impact across society. This exploration points out that 
institutions play an important role in creating, managing, and 
distributing risks in society. After highlighting the integrated 
risk governance framework as a nascent practice-oriented 
framework, the framework is examined theoretically using 
sociological neoinstitutionalism and Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality. The conclusion elaborates the challenges 
of using these two bodies of knowledge to study risk gover-
nance of extreme events. Although Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality corrects neoinstitutional theory’s ambiva-
lence toward power, more work needs to be done in order to 
reconcile their divergent intellectual commitments.
Keywords governmentality, risk, risk governance, sociologi-
cal neoinstitutionalism
1 Introduction
The study of risk is informed by a diverse range of theoretical 
approaches that cut across multiple disciplines. While the for-
mal study of risk is a recent affair, the endeavor to make sense 
of the unknown has been pursued since time immemorial. 
The economic historian Peter Bernstein noted that the story of 
risk is very much cast in the Greek mythological struggle of 
Prometheus, of how humans “defied the gods and probed the 
darkness in search of light that converted the future from an 
enemy into an opportunity” (Bernstein 1996, 1). 
Much has been said about the contribution of the risk 
enterprise to the economy and, at a more fundamental level, 
modern society. Rather than recounting the accomplishments 
in technical sophistication of risk research and application, 
this article stresses the less obvious aspects of risk, particu-
larly the way through which risks and knowledge about risks 
are being produced, reproduced, and propagated. 
This article is organized as follows. First, it briefly traces 
the career of risk through its multi-faceted conceptualizations 
across prominent theoretical approaches. An introduction to 
these various approaches is necessary because risk research 
has become a multidisciplinary enterprise. This multidiscipli-
narity is best demonstrated by highlighting the technical 
approach most salient in the physical sciences, and the social 
science approaches commonly encountered in economics, 
psychology, and sociology. Institutions are important in 
creating, managing, and distributing risks in society, and risk 
governance constitutes a nascent practice-oriented framework 
that not only consolidates the assessment and management of 
risk, but also guides decision making. Sociological neoinsti-
tutionalism and Foucauldian governmentality are used in the 
next section to examine risk governance. It is beyond the 
scope of this article to weave the two theories together in an 
elaborate fashion. But by introducing them, more researchers 
may consider either using them to theorize risk governance 
or to explore alternative theories in lieu of popular ones. 
Using both bodies of knowledge, particularly their divergent 
intellectual commitments, creates challenges to both risk 
practitioners and researchers.
2 Four Approaches toward Risk
This section is less about conducting an exhaustive literature 
review, and more about summarizing how risk is conceptual-
ized in multiple disciplines. Others have conducted compre-
hensive surveys either across disciplines (Slovic 1992; Renn 
1998), or have made more targeted comparisons between 
them, for instance between psychology and sociology in 
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Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006). These reviews constitute 
fundamental baselines for understanding risk research. 
Four approaches to risk are discussed: (1) the technical 
approach; (2) the economic approach; (3) the psychological 
approach; and (4) the sociological approach. The choice of 
sequence is deliberate as the first three approaches are onto-
logically closest because they subscribe to a more realist view 
that asserts it is not only possible to produce a more precise 
and quantifiable value of risk, but also possible to distinguish 
between real (that is, what actually is “out there”) and 
imagined risks, since risk often exists chiefly as a within-
person perception, albeit one that is collectively experienced 
(Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006). Finally, the sociological 
approach is discussed and the different aspects are elaborated 
in which a sociological approach is compatible with but also 
contrasted to the aforementioned approaches. 
Before examining the individual approaches, a general 
definition is in order. There is a broad understanding that risks 
refer to the “possibility that human actions or events lead to 
consequences that affect aspects of what humans value” 
(Renn 1998, 51). In particular, the emphasis on consequences 
is on the negative aspects of human activities in the form 
of physical loss (such as infrastructural damage), human 
injuries, and deaths. Death as the potential ultimate dreadful 
outcome seems to be the lowest common denominator across 
various approaches toward risk (Douglas 1990; Renn 1992).
2.1 Technical Approach
The technical approach (for example in the engineering 
sciences) aims to provide a quantitative value of risk to sup-
port decision making in the public and private sectors. Risk in 
the technical sense refers to the product of the probability of 
an event or activity with negative effects (for instance loss of 
property or death) and the magnitude of the event (Douglas 
1990; Renn 1998). The focus on calculation of risk came with 
the realization that technological accidents could exact huge 
costs on society (Starr 1969). As a result, the concern for 
safety regarding technological systems with great potential 
for harm necessitates incorporating risk assessment early in 
the design phase and not as an afterthought in the wake of 
accidents (Starr and Whipple 1980).
The technical approach rests on three key assumptions. 
First, the historical data available for any activity or event is 
sufficient to show consistent patterns of fatalities (Starr 1969). 
Second, the data contains sufficient information about soci-
etal preference and the costs involved to drive prediction for 
the technical approach to guide decision making effectively 
(Starr 1969). Undergirding both assumptions is the condition 
that the causal agents responsible for the fatalities are so 
stable that the predictions will be reliable (Renn 1998).
In practice, these assumptions are often not met. For 
instance, new technologies such as nuclear power plants have 
not accumulated enough accidents to permit probabilistic 
analysis in the actuarial sense. Instead, researchers first 
estimate the probability of failure of individual components 
of such complex technical systems, including the interactiona l 
effects between components, before synthesizing all the prob-
abilities to model the overall failure rate of the system (Starr 
and Whipple 1984; Renn 1998). 
The technical approach, while capable of producing 
precise values of risk, faces several issues. For one, different 
combinations of the product of probabilities and the 
magnitudes of consequences can generate the same value. In 
other words, low-probability high-consequence and high-
probability low-consequence events can share identical risk 
values. This situation presents a conundrum because it 
provides little additional information to prescribe risk mitiga-
tion that can be customized to these two distinctive categories 
of events. Several studies, particularly in psychological 
research (Slovic 1987; Renn 1998), suggest that people 
also show preference for one category of events or the other. 
Specifically, they are more repulsed by singular events that 
maim and kill a lot of people at once. Terrorist attacks using 
car bombs versus the fatalities caused by car accidents 
illustrate this contrast.
In addition, risk analysis that is limited to a technical 
approach captures only a narrow set of failure scenarios. 
To elaborate, failures in complex technological systems are 
seldom completely technical in nature, but also are compli-
cated by management issues or social events (Perrow 1984; 
Renn 1998). As a result, researchers have argued for a socio-
technical approach that account for both technical and social 
dimensions of risk (Turner 1979).
The technical approach is also less equipped to address 
issues that are social in nature. There was a growing discom-
fort from the 1960s with the dominant technical view that 
assumed everyone accepted the benefits and costs espoused 
by experts, but that assumption ignored subjective experience 
toward risks (Slovic 1992; Renn 1998). Coupled with and 
related to this concern was the understanding that questions 
about risk distribution in society were trans-scientific in 
nature (Weinberg 1972; Slovic 1992). That is to say, while 
these questions are asked of science, they could not be 
answered by science alone. Decisions about risk acceptability 
require political intervention, particularly when consensus 
among different stakeholders (for example, the state and the 
public) cannot be achieved (Starr and Whipple 1980).
2.2 Economic and Psychological Approaches
Risk in the economic sense is conceptualized as “possible” 
cost and not “actual” cost, as it also takes into account the 
likelihood of the occurrence of the adverse event (Renn 1998). 
Compared to the technical approach, the cost-based concept 
of risk under economics also takes into account the extent to 
which individuals express subjective dissatisfaction toward 
the event. This conceptualization allows researchers and 
decision makers to address the question that is not possible 
under the technical approach, which is how much risk 
is enough (Renn 1998). The assumption follows the rational 
actor paradigm (or RAP), which is that individuals act 
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rationally to serve their self-interests in all situations (Renn 
1992). 
The psychological approach shares two main similarities 
with the economic approach. First, risk is also a subjective 
interpretation of negative effects of an event or activity. 
Second, it also subscribes to the rational actor assumption, 
specifically the bounded rationality model (Taylor-Gooby 
and Zinn 2006). Under the bounded rationality model, indi-
viduals act to serve their self-interests under limited informa-
tion in most circumstances. As a result, they seek satisfactory 
solutions at costs most acceptable to them, rather than to 
achieve optimal results at any cost. 
The psychological approach differs from the economic 
approach in the following way—instead of conceptualizing 
risk as a function of cost or loss, the former treats risks as 
instances of cognitive bias and mental heuristic. In other 
words, while humans are innately rational, their risk percep-
tions are not always accurate. Their subjective interpretations 
may not be congruent with the reality “out there” because 
they can be easily “warped” by cognitive biases and mental 
short-cuts (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). The way that 
issues are framed also influences whether individuals per-
ceive the situation to be a winning or losing one, and hence 
adjust their risk appetite accordingly (Tversky and Kahneman 
1981; Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). 
The psychological approach, known as “the wisdom of the 
lay public” (Renn 2008b, 20), is also often contrasted with 
expert judgment (Slovic 1999). Ironically, the public under 
this approach seems hardly capable of wisdom. Research 
shows that risk perceptions not only vary in terms of the activ-
ity or domain of interest, for instance smoking or nuclear 
power plant safety (Slovic 1992), they are also influenced by 
contextual factors such as the extent of “dread” that people 
understand the consequences could be and the number of 
people involved (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982). 
In addition, people’s beliefs and worldviews about the causes 
of risk, as well as their demographics (for example, sex and 
race) and professional commitments, as a scientist or lawyer 
(Slovic 1999) also influence their risk perceptions (Otway 
and Thomas 1982).
Recent reflections by distinguished scholars suggest that 
the psychological approach is shedding its naive insistence 
that risk perception is an enterprise of logic and scientific 
deliberation unadulterated by emotions and social context 
(Fischhoff 1995; Slovic et al. 2004). As an example, Slovic 
and his associates, who recast feelings as “neural and 
psychological substrate of utility” (Slovic et al. 2004, 321), 
recognize that risk perceptions are products of the analytic 
and experiential minds, and, more importantly, that it is not 
meaningful to emphasize one over the other.
2.3 Sociological Approach
Compared to the above approaches, the ontological positions 
in sociology are more varied. There are studies that range 
from a conspicuous realist view to a strong social construc-
tionist view and in between the two polar opposites, others 
that are hybrids of both views in varying degrees. In fact, 
most studies do not dismiss that risks are both fact and value 
laden, or they contain both objective and subjective elements 
(Tierney 1999; Renn 2008a; Hansson 2010). Therefore, risks 
are deeply situated in the social context and the analysis of 
risk cannot be treated as value-free. 
Research on the social amplification of risk counts as 
one effort to reconcile ontological realism with the social 
constructionist view (Kasperson 1992; Renn 1998; Pidgeon, 
Kasperson, and Slovic 2003). Beyond psychological influ-
ences, the social amplification of risk framework highlights 
other factors such as culture and institutions (most promi-
nently, media and government agencies) that amplify and 
attenuate risk interpretations via a network of socially 
mediated communication channels (Kasperson et al. 1988; 
Kasperson 1992; Pidgeon, Kasperson, and Slovic 2003; 
Masuda and Garvin 2006).
Researchers have also pointed out that risk research should 
not be confined to only issues pertaining to risk management 
and communication; it should also examine the antecedents, 
that is, the risk assessment domain (Freudenburg 1992). 
Efforts are also made to locate the emergence, production, 
and predominance of risk within the broader social fabric of 
society (Luhmann 1993; Beck 1999). In particular, Beck’s 
(1999) risk society concept also draws out the risk that a 
society chiefly powered by science and technology will trans-
form itself into a natural laboratory of dangerous experiments 
that lacks barriers to limit its destructive consequences.
The cultural approach also focuses on the social forces that 
produce risk, particularly the contest among multiple social 
groups (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). The cultural approach 
argues that risks should be treated as “social processes rather 
than physical entities that exist independently of the humans 
who assess and experience them” (Bradbury 1989, 389). It 
emphasizes how risk is also a prominent way today to talk 
about danger by linking it to some moral defect or disap-
proved behavior, yet at the same time, strategically avoiding 
the language of religion that is cast in sin and taboo (Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 1990). By capitalizing on its 
legacy of science, risk can also be legitimately deployed to 
induce fear (Douglas 1990).
There is also a conspicuous resistance against the RAP 
pervasive in earlier approaches. Alternative theories, such as 
social amplification of risk, are proposed to attend to broader 
social and institutional forces, which also shape how risks are 
produced, perceived, and regulated (Jaeger et al. 2001). These 
influences are typically invisible in approaches that subscribe 
to RAP. The essence of these alternative theories is that they 
not only reveal the rigid, authoritative, and deterministic 
character of RAP, but also clarify its limits in defining and 
measuring risks.
Another prominent sociological approach toward risk is 
the social constructionist view. It has its roots in the social 
construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann [1966] 1991), 
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and the more specialized areas of social study of science and 
technology (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Pinch and Bijker 
1984; Latour 1987), as well as natural hazards and disaster 
research (Clarke and Short 1993; Vaughan 1996; Tierney 
1999; Vaughan 1999; Renn 2008a). Central to this view is that 
risk is a social construct that reflects how society deals with 
uncertainty (Tierney and Bevc 2007). This perspective goes 
beyond risks as externally quantifiable objects (the technical 
approach) or as individual cognitive biases (the psychological 
approach). It conceives risks as products of social interactions 
that are deeply embedded in social structures (Manning 1989; 
Tierney 1999). To clarify, while a social constructionist 
approach does not claim that risk does not exist, it seeks to 
reveal and elaborate its social etiology (Turner 1979), that is, 
the process through which “social agents create and use 
boundaries to demarcate that which is dangerous” (Clarke 
and Short 1993, 379). 
The critical perspective in sociology has also highlighted 
the social inequality and vulnerability created and perpetuate d 
through the interactions between risks and power (Tierney 
1999; Blaikie, Cannon, and Wisner 2001). Hurricane Katrina 
illustrates how risks and their wrathful incarnation as disas-
ters do not rise from a vacuum but are continually shaped by 
political, social, and economic forces that occupy the public 
sphere (Tierney 2005; Freudenburg et al. 2007). More impor-
tantly, the critical approach recognizes that risks and the 
accompanying processes of risk-making are social in nature 
and that risks can manifest as events. These events further 
exert disproportionate destruction on lives and property across 
race, class, and gender.
Distilled from the social constructionist and critical 
perspectives are also the predominance of organizations and 
the state as the legitimate claims-makers and final arbiters to 
define what count as risks and what do not (Clarke 1988; 
Stallings 1995). Whether such risks are “distorted” through 
the prism of cognitive biases or mental heuristics become 
moot because the broader institutional arrangements have 
already decided for the public what should be the risks and 
which parties are to bear them. 
Institutionalized organizations such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are also not 
immune to error and failure (Perrow 2011). Perrow (1984) 
and Shrader-Frechette (1985) describe how nuclear power 
risk assessments are influenced by organizational consider-
ations, resulting in the exclusion of many potential causes of 
system failure. Institutions can also become recreant and fail 
to discharge their responsibilities “with the degree of rigor 
necessary to merit societal trust” (Freudenburg 1993, 909). 
In other instances, an institution might inadvertently and 
unreflectively routinize a higher tolerance of risk beyond 
what is acceptable for safety operations, therefore incubating 
the risk for an opportune delivery of disaster (Turner 1976; 
Vaughan 2004). 
Another illustration of how institutional arrangements 
affect risk production is the partial nuclear meltdown in the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant after the March 2011 
earthquake and tsunami. It can be argued that the disaster 
is an unintended result of the longstanding relationships 
between the state and institutionalized organizations in the 
nuclear industry. To elaborate, the weak enforcement of gov-
ernmental oversight stems from the revolving door practices 
prevalent in Japan, also known as the amakudari (“descent 
from heaven”) system. Specific to the nuclear establishment 
in Japan, senior civil servants from the powerful Ministry of 
Trade, Economy and Industry (that is, from “heaven”) retire 
early to accept jobs in energy corporations, such as TEPCO 
(the company that owns the Fukushima power plant), that are 
regulated by their former colleagues back in the Nuclear and 
Industrial Safety Agency, which is a part of the trade ministry 
(Onishi and Belson 2011). The strong social cohesion of 
the nuclear establishment, also known as the “nuclear power 
village,” further discourages whistle-blowing (Onishi and 
Belson 2011). 
Researchers have also argued that organizations and insti-
tutions—such as the scientific community, federal agencies, 
and the mass media—often feed inconsistent information 
to the public. This is because the views of these disparate 
collectivities are shaped by professional and organizational 
interests (Sapolsky 1990). More importantly, the divergence 
in perceptions is unintentional but due to the inherent adver-
sarial nature of the politics of risk (Sapolsky 1990). But not 
all researchers accept such a benign view of the state and 
other institutionalized organizations. For example, Perrow 
(2011) asserts that the 2008 financial crisis is a case of execu-
tive failure. According to him, even though the tight coupling 
and complexity in the global financial system may have 
exacerbated the situation, executives—industry leaders and 
government officials alike—have committed malfeasance 
by discounting and even dismissing the warnings prior to 
meltdown. 
The attempts by organizations and institutions to create 
and simultaneously tame risk are still ongoing. The next 
section highlights the emergence of risk governance as one 
such effort.
3 Risk Governance as an Emergent 
Approach
Given that risk research has expanded dramatically to include 
assessment, management, and communication of risk, there is 
a movement toward creating a comprehensive framework 
that comprises all these components under the term risk 
governance. One definition of risk governance refers to how 
various actors, rules, conventions, processes, and mechanisms 
are involved in collecting, analyzing, and communicating risk 
information and the decisions taken to manage risks (Renn 
and Walker 2008; Renn 2008a). The focus on risk governance 
in this article is neither on the mechanics nor its application to 
specific extreme events, but rather its emergence within the 
broader historical and socio-political context. As pointed 
out by Jasanoff, the emphasis on governance attends to the 
Lim. Understanding Risk Governance 15
politics of dealing with risks (Jasanoff 1990, 2010). In 
addition, governance as a form of control also hints at the 
collective decision-making structures and processes between 
government and nongovernment actors (Nye and Donahue 
2000). The shift of power has moved precipitously toward the 
latter, particularly the business sector. As a result, an umbrell a 
term is required to capture the attempts at regulation and con-
trol by both sets of actors, and hence the strategic maneuver 
of vocabulary to reflect the shift from acts of government to a 
more ambivalent term, acts of governance (Hutter 2006).
This movement toward a more conspicuous private, 
particularly corporate, ownership of public services and the 
putative partnership between the public and the private in risk 
governance also raises concern. Taking the case of critical 
infrastructure (for example, electric power network) in the 
United States, a significant proportion belongs to private 
firms.i The ownership is further complicated by the inter-
relationships between utility executives and regulators 
(Feinstein 2006). These issues surface tensions between regu-
lators and private companies, as well as matters regarding 
costs and public responsibilities (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission 2003; U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task 
Force 2004).
Taken together, the role of institutions and the emergence 
of risk governance under the growing imbalance of regulatory 
power between government and nongovernment actors 
suggest that the processes and the institutional arrangements 
in which risks are being produced and distributed in society 
are thrown into even sharper relief. It is against this backdrop 
that the concepts of sociological neoinstitutionalism and 
Foucauldian governmentality help to expand and deepen 
research on risk governance of extreme events. 
Sociological institutionalism is considered one of the most 
significant research programs in contemporary U.S. sociolog y 
(Jepperson 2002). Just as important, using neoinstitutional-
ism also responds to distinguished disaster sociologist 
Quarantelli’s (2005) call to integrate disaster research—of 
which risk governance of extreme events is a prominent 
topic—with core sociological concerns and within broader 
theoretical frameworks. 
The final sections of the article proceed as follows: (1) 
sociological neoinstitutionalism is sketched out; (2) legiti-
macy is focused on as one of the more prominent research 
streams under the broader program of neoinstitutionalism; (3) 
Foucauldian governmentality is introduced to fill specific 
gaps in neoinstitutionalism; and (4) an analysis of the chal-
lenges involved in applying Foucauldian governmentality 
concludes the discussion. 
4 Introducing Neoinstitutionalism and 
Governmentality
Neoinstitutionalism and governmentality attend to different 
but related questions. Neoinstitutionalists are interested about 
how and why specific formal and informal mechanisms and 
the involvement of specific configurations of actors emerge 
and become appropriate over time. Governmentality research-
ers ask those questions, but emphasize why these mechanisms 
and actors are privileged in the first place. Broadly speaking, 
neoinstitutionalism asks about the attainment and change 
in status quo of institutional arrangements, while governmen-
tality challenges and attempts to reveal the power dynamics 
underlying the status quo.
Sociological neoinstitutionalism deliberately shifts away 
from the atomistic and realist view that has dominated the 
intellectual landscape of American sociology. As pointed out 
by Friedland and Alford (1991), neoinstitutionalism attempts 
to reclaim society as a meaningful level of analysis that it is 
not simply a sum of individual actions and inter-relationships 
among social collectivities.ii At its ontological core, neoinsti-
tutional theory is social constructionist, in that it emphasizes 
the shared knowledge and meanings that emerge through 
social interactions (Berger and Luckmann [1966] 1991). It 
takes organizations seriously as interpretive systems (Daft 
and Weick 1984), noting how they purposefully tap into 
wider worlds of meaning to leverage their power (Oliver 
1991; Scott 2001; Mohr and Friedland 2008). Scott says most 
lucidly how organized actors import meaningful accounts 
from their environment rather than to reinvent the wheel from 
within: “All of us to some degree design or tailor our worlds, 
but we never do this from raw cloth; indeed, for the most part 
we get our worlds ready to wear” (Scott 1991, 170).
Several studies support the neoinstitutional view. They 
show that organizations often either do not completely 
behave rationally or strictly follow a functional logic (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Latent in the 
discussion is culture, and its effects become particularly dis-
cernible when either efficiency or productivity is not aligned 
with organizational claims in their goals or values (DiMaggio 
1994). Organizations that adopt structures and practices to 
conform to their institutional context are considered institu-
tionalized (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In particular, organiza-
tions in the same field, for example the U.S. radio industry 
described by Leblebici et al. (1991), become institutionalized 
and look increasingly similar because they respond to three 
environmental conditions: (1) political or regulatory pres-
sures (coercive isomorphism); (2) uncertain or ambiguous 
environment (mimetic isomorphism); and (3) professional-
ization efforts (normative isomorphism) (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). 
Seen this way, organizations are no longer conceived as 
purposive, completely bounded, and independent entities. 
Instead, they are well-embedded in their cultural environment 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer 2008). This is a rejection 
of the tabula rasa approach in which organizations not only 
exist but function in a vacuum (Perrow 1986; Jepperson and 
Meyer 1991). Instead, their actions are organized by the 
scripts and schemas available in their environment. 
The nested model inherent in neoinstitutional theory means 
that organizations are conceived as being embedded in their 
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organizational fields and environments (Meyer and Scott 
1983; Zucker 1988; Christensen and Molin 1995). The 
broade r cultural and historical environment thus exerts 
influence on organizations, hence causing them to modify 
their behavior and structures accordingly. For example, 
Christensen and Molin (1995) found that in line with broader 
societal expectations over the past century of democratic 
ways of organization, the governance system in the Danish 
Red Cross not only became more participative by gradually 
including local branches in the decision-making process, but 
has also eventually rejected the call to separate professionals 
and volunteers in its organizational structure. 
4.1 Legitimacy
Neoinstitutionalism explains how and why organizational 
arrangements continue to persist over time even when there 
are compelling rational or functional reasons for their 
modification or demise. These arrangements persist because 
organizations retain them to gain and sustain legitimacy 
vis-a-vis other organizations that share the same institutional 
environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This quest for legiti-
macy in turn ensures their survival. Similar to institutions, 
legitimacy is a central concept in neoinstitutionalism that is 
often deployed but seldom formally defined. Researchers 
have referred to legitimacy as “social fitness” (Oliver 1991) 
or “the degree of cultural support for an organization” (Meyer 
and Scott 1983, 201). Suchman (1995) and Archibald (2004) 
highlight the importance of collective perception, particularly 
the acceptance by both internal and external audience in order 
for an organization to be seen as legitimate. The notion of 
collective perception is crucial here because it is the appear-
ance of consensus that confers legitimacy. This article refers 
to Suchman’s definition that has gained acceptability in orga-
nizational research. He defines legitimacy as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman 1995, 574).
Legitimacy is always defined with reference to some 
social group (Deephouse 1996). In other words, what one 
group perceives as legitimate does not mean it will be 
legitimate to another. In addition, legitimacy, as highlighted 
by Suchman, is also socially constructed. Many studies on 
legitimacy adopt Suchman’s (1995) typology: (1) pragmatic, 
(2) moral, and (3) cognitive legitimacy.iii Briefly, pragmatic 
legitimacy is associated with interest and exchange. The 
exchange could be monetary or something more abstract, 
such as commitment. Moral legitimacy is based on whether 
the organizational activity is considered “the right thing 
to do.” Finally, when other organizations confer cognitive 
legitimacy to another organization, they are basing their 
acceptance on some taken-for-granted cultural account.
Although terms such as institutions and legitimacy are 
known to be deployed in the study of risks and its governance, 
few studies use neoinstitutionalism in a substantive way. The 
terms are used in a very loose way and seldom defined, such 
as O’Neill et al.’s (2007) study of the miscommunication in 
the 2001 anthrax attacks and Baldi’s (1995) account of the 
transformation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. Baldi’s study 
is especially illustrative because, while it gestures toward 
sociological neoinstitutionalism, its substantive theoretical 
base is more economics than sociology. Thus one can argue 
that using neoinstitutional theory in a more serious manner 
produces more careful and precise articulation of the legiti-
macy of institutions that inform research on risk governance 
of extreme events.
Efforts have also been made to make neoinstitutional 
theory more sensitive to questions related to agency, interests, 
and power (DiMaggio 1988) because neoinstitutionalist 
accounts typically elide questions about why some structures, 
processes, and outcomes are institutionalized or considered 
more valuable in the first place. Foucault’s ideas concerning 
governmentality provide a corrective for this weakness 
because they treat institutionalization as naturalization. The 
emphasis on classifications, routines, scripts, and schemas in 
neoinstitutional theory also provides a natural entry point to 
introduce Foucauldian conceptions about the deep coupling 
between power and knowledge (Power 2011). Discussion of 
the concept of governmentality reveals the power/knowledge 
connection.
4.2 Foucault’s Concept of Governmentality
During his Collège de France lectures in early 1978, Michel 
Foucault (2007) coined the term governmentality to describe 
the array of institutions,iv forms of knowledge, and techniques 
that enables the exercise of power over its target population. 
In other words, when Foucault says something has been gov-
ernmentalized, he is saying that it has assumed a particular 
form and style of managing its subjects. Foucault arrived 
at this conclusion through his historical analysis of how 
Machiavellian ideas about the sovereignty of the state no 
longer constituted the only form of power in society, and thus 
was further complemented by other forms of power, namely 
discipline and government. By sovereignty, Foucault refers 
to the theory and practice of royal administrative rule under 
feudal monarchy, which depended solely on the formal, 
juridical, and the executive arm of the state (Dean 2010). By 
discipline, Foucault refers to practices that are based in the 
military, monasteries, schools, and even prisons (Foucault 
[1977] 1995, 2007). 
Governmentality can be read in two different but related 
ways. First, as an analytic of government, it attempts to reveal 
our taken-for-granted ways of doing things, revealing how we 
think about and question them (Lemke 2002; Dean 2010). 
Second, as a problematic of government (Foucault 2007), 
governmentality also reveals how an issue is construed as a 
problem and thus becomes an opportunity to be solved.
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While Foucault originally discounts the strength of state 
sovereignty, more recent governmentality studies on contem-
porary neoliberal practices find that it has neither diminished 
nor reduced. In addition, new actors (for example, nongov-
ernmental organizations, such as global credit rating agen-
cies) are entering the scene of government, thus reconfiguring 
the nature and relations of the state and civil society (Rose 
1999; Lemke 2002; Deuchars 2010).
5 Challenges and Conclusion
There are issues associated with deploying governmentality 
within a neoinstitutionalist account. While both theories agree 
that organizations strive for legitimacy, they diverge on the 
motivations and the conditions under which it is attained. 
What neoinstitutionalism treats as social alignment within the 
prevailing rational or just order (Schneiberg and Bartley 
2001), governmentality sees as oppression even though no 
single party can be identified as the oppressor.v Said in 
another way, while governmentality recognizes how the 
neoinstitutonalist account reveals patterns of domination 
and subtle forms of subjugation in organizations, it criticizes 
neoinstitutionalism for not going far enough to problematize 
the status quo as being oppressive (Cooper, Ezzamel, and 
Willmott 2008). From the governmentality perspective, 
institutionalization means something has become taken for 
granted, and hence not questioned or criticized. Although 
efforts are made to infuse neoinstitutionalism with greater 
emphasis on interest and agency (DiMaggio 1988), the 
governmentality perspective expects more because the 
neoinstitutionalist account is resistant to questions like why 
something is institutionalized or considered more valuable in 
the first place. 
However, neoinstitutionalism also points out that while 
governmentality highlights power, it also does not go far 
enough to emphasize contest. For example, it is often argued 
that although governmentality theorists identify neoliberal-
ism as the governmental rationality that seeds the emergence 
of various market-based governance mechanisms across soci-
eties, there is anemic indication of struggle among the actors. 
To illustrate, if one applies the governmentality lens to envi-
ronmental governance, environmental groups seem complicit 
in the act of consigning nature to commercial exploitation, 
albeit in a more measured way. 
The governance of risk carries such dire societal conse-
quences that it cannot be treated as a tidy and unproblematic 
exercise of technical analyses and calculated interventions. It 
emerges from specific historical and socio-political contexts, 
and serves particular interests. By suggesting a lens that 
carefully merges neoinstitutionalism and governmentality to 
examine risk governance, this article responds to James 
Short’s original mandate for social scientists in general, 
and sociologists in particular, to bring their “perspectives, 
knowledge and methods” to bear on risk (Short 1984, 722). 
Notes
i The figure quoted can be as high as 85 percent, as announced by U.S. 
Senator Robert F. Bernnett following his introduction of S. 1456, 
Critical Infrastructure Information Security Act of 2001, on 24 
September 2001. The 80 or 85 percent figure seems to be the “magic 
figure” quoted by various sources, but without reference to any 
official reports or empirical studies. 
ii The return to studying institutions (hence the emergence of neoinsti-
tutionalism) in sociology was part of a broader social science move-
ment that began in the late 1960s. In economics, for example, 
researchers such as North (1994) acknowledge that institutions matter 
in economic development. He highlights how institutions supply the 
rules that allow players (such as organizations) to participate in the 
economic game in a concerted manner. North’s conceptualization 
of institutions refers to formal (for example, laws) and informal (for 
example, self-imposed codes of conduct) constraints that define the 
incentive structure for economic behavior. It is a definition that has 
gained traction in new institutional economics research (Williamson 
1994). 
  In comparison, the sociological definition of institutions is less 
restrictive. It goes beyond rules and can be embodied in social 
collectivities, such as the family and formal organizations like the 
state (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In fact, societies are argued to be 
“agglomeration of institutions” (Berger and Luckmann [1966] 1991, 
55).
  More varieties of neoinstitutionalism are discussed in Schmidt 
(2006). Another insightful discussion is DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1991) introduction in their now classic book, The New Institutional-
ism in Organizational Analysis.
iii Suchman’s (1995) typology is significantly more sophisticated and 
nuanced than the three broad types presented in this article. To illus-
trate, under moral legitimacy Suchman further distills it into three 
forms of legitimacy: consequential legitimacy, procedural legitimacy, 
and structural legitimacy. In addition, neoinstitutional theorists have 
also advocated other dimensions and typologies of legitimacies. For 
details, see Deephouse and Suchman (2004). 
iv Institutions here resemble those highlighted under the “old” socio-
logical institutionalism as they refer to organizations that “take on a 
special character and to achieve a distinctive competence, perhaps, a 
trained in-built capacity.” See Selznick (1996, 271). In another 
instance, borrowing from Robert Castel’s L’Ordre Psychiatrique, 
Foucault also points out that the hospital as an institution is deeply 
connected with what he calls the “psychiatric order.” See Foucault 
(2007).
v This seems to be the modus operandi for governmentality research, as 
it refuses to reify any particular social entity, especially prominent 
ones, such as the state. For example, the state is conceived as a 
nominal entity with no essential function or necessity. See Gordon 
(1991).
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